Denmark
2024 | 2022 | |
---|---|---|
Ranking | 88 / 98 | - |
Original Score * As some Indicators can be skipped where data is unavailable, the maximum overall and Domain scores are not identical for each country. Country rankings are generated from ratios of the maximum scores and the achieved scores. | 68 / 392 | - |
Oct 2024
The Indicators have been classified by the stage of the influence process at which they occur. Some Indicators correspond to exposure to PRC influence, e.g. the presence of Confucius Institutes. Others test for pressure – such as visa denials to academics or journalists. Finally, some Indicators capture the effect of PRC influence, such as national policy changes in favor of PRC interests.
The individual Layer scores for each country are tallied and displayed via rankings.
Exposure * Exposure assesses the conditions that make the target country vulnerable to PRC‘s influence, e.g. in terms of economic dependence, or the receiving of some form of benefit. | 2024 | 2022 |
---|---|---|
Ranking | 88 / 98 | - |
Level of Score | 16 % | - |
Pressure * Pressure measures the actions that the PRC directly or indirectly exerts over the target country in order to change the behavior of people in the target country, e.g. in terms of threatening economic punishment to provoke/prevent a political decision. | 2024 | 2022 |
---|---|---|
Ranking | 25 / 98 | - |
Level of Score | 28 % | - |
Alignment * Alignment evaluates the degree of accommodations the target country makes to the PRC, and the actual policy changes and impacts on the target country. | 2024 | 2022 |
---|---|---|
Ranking | 87 / 98 | - |
Level of Score | 15 % | - |
In 2023, Denmark had a GDP per capita of US$67,967 and a total population of 5.93 million people.
Denmark established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1950. Denmark was ranked 2nd in Reporters Without Borders‘ 2024 World Press Freedom Index, and rated Free in Freedom House‘s 2024 Global Freedom Index, with a score of 97/100.
Key Takeaways
- Taken together, China’s presence in Denmark and ability to influence Danish society is rather low (as compared to a decade ago) following several years of media (as well as judicial) investigation into Danish-Chinese relations, accompanied by a host of new laws and regulation efforts from the Danish authorities to curb PRC influence in Denmark. Also, the general Danish population increasingly holds a negative view on China and the CCP. This is also reflected in critical media coverage on China.
- While the Danish government has renewed its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China in 2023, institutionalized cooperation between the two sides has been largely reduced to green areas such as climate change, sustainability and the environment.
- Research cooperation between Danish universities and Chinese partners has come under scrutiny and pressure in recent years, but some pockets of institutionalized ties remain, notably within the framework of the Sino-Danish Center.
- Danish authorities and suppliers of critical infrastructure are currently phasing out Chinese-produced telecom and surveillance equipment, while the Danish Police Intelligence Service has singled out China as one of the primary cyber espionage threats to Denmark.
- In general Danish foreign policy has always been focused on Danish businesses and industry. The comprehensive strategic partnership with the PRC has been majorly overhauled after Covid. It now mainly focuses on climate, energy and environmental collaboration. The Sino-Danish Center is also an important part, but this may be due to sunk cost fallacy.
Percentage scores do not suggest some degree out of a “completely influenced” level of 100%. The percentages express the country‘s score out of the total achievable amount based on the Indicators for each Domain.
Media
The Media Domain evaluates how PRC entities influence public debate and media coverage about the PRC in the Index country.
In my country, there are media organizations that belong to the World Chinese Media (世界华文媒体) network.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are journalists or media organizations which are members of the Belt and Road Media Cooperation Alliance/Union, the Belt and Road News Alliance, or other Belt and Road media networks that connected to PRC (e.g. Belt and Road Media Community, Belt and Road Journalists Network, Belt and Road News Network, or B&R TV Networks).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, journalists, media organizations, or online influencers have participated in international travel organized by PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
94 countries answered this indicator; 4 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Only a few Danish media have China correspondents. It is highly unlikely that any of these well-established media would accept such invitations from China.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are journalists, media organizations or online influencers who have received trainings from PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC state media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or majority owned by PRC-connected individuals or entities, or media owners who have significant business interests in the PRC.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 1 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is one rather insignificant news site that targets local Chinese citizens. It has been operating for a number of years, providing info on Danish news.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, media outlets have delivered content provided by PRC state-funded media, or under content-sharing agreements with PRC state-funded media.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
One China Policy instead of principle
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, local newspapers, online news websites, content farms, or social media platforms receive economic support by regularly featuring advertisements from PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Many Danish media (traditional and social ones) run advertisements for Chinese companies (e.g. Polestar or Temu), but I assume that such traditional forms of advertising do not count as `influence´ in this regard.
Supplementary Notes
No URLS, this is naturally not something that is official policy, but it is well known.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denunciation, revocation of journalist ID, denial of visa, lawsuits, or threat thereof.
2024
Skip
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no publicly available information about such practices. But the experts are aware of one case of threats of visa denial against a journalist (in the past few years). Moreover, Asia correspondents currently situated in Taiwan are under pressure.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are media organizations that describe relations with the PRC as based on friendship, brotherhood, or otherwise use emotive language that refers to the relationship in familial terms.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. a media personality who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Academia
The Academia Domain measures how the PRC state attempts to restrict academic freedom by influencing or interfering with the Index country‘s academic and educational activities.
In my country, universities have established research partnerships with PRC-connected entities. (e.g. Huawei, Tencent or Alibaba)
2024
Yes
Answer ( 2 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Some Danish universities (University of Aarhus, University of Copenhagen and Denmark's Technical University) have been cooperating with BGI. Aarhus university has recently announced that it has terminated the cooperation (see first link). University of Copenhagen (see second link) and Denmark's Technical University seem to still have active cooperation with BGI-affiliated researchers (second and third link).
- https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/seneste/universitet-afbryder-samarbejde-med-kinesisk-virksomhed-vi-ved-ikke-hvordan-vores
- https://www1.bio.ku.dk/english/research/cbp/epithelial-cell-biology-lab/
- https://www.bioengineering.dtu.dk/research/research-sections/section-for-microbial-and-chemical-ecology/bacterial-ecophysiology-and-biotechnology/projekter
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/int_kina/art7835507/Aalborg-Universitet-har-hjulpet-omstridt-kinesisk-firma-der-bidrager-til-forf%C3%B8lgelse-og-overv%C3%A5gning-af-millioner
Supplementary Notes
Previously (i.e. until the end of 2022), another Danish university have had a coorporation agreement with Huawei, see e.g. Link.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are Confucius Institutes/Classrooms or other PRC-affiliated Chinese language centers based at universities.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 1 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In Denmark, there are two Confucius Institutes: the one at the International Business Academy and the other at Next Education–Ballerup.
- https://www.digmandarin.com/confucius-institutes-around-the-world.html#:~:text=Denmark,Next%20Education%E2%80%93Ballerup
- https://iba.dk/fuldtidsuddannelser/confucius-institute/
- https://english.kmust.edu.cn/info/1012/1026.htm
Supplementary Notes
Kolding
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K-12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no national policy on this, but a few public schools and highschools may have some agreements. However, it is highly unlikely that they accept subsidized books or teachers from the PRC.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, one or more think tanks and academic research centers belong to PRC-affiliated networks/associations (such as: the Silk Road Think Tank Association, Silk Road Think Tank Network [SiLKS], Belt and Road Studies Network, University Alliance of the Silk Road, University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities, such as through grants, donations, sponsored exchange programs, or fellowship programs at PRC institutions.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
91 countries answered this indicator; 7 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
No public reports about this.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, experts participate in PRC talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Program or Changjiang Scholars program.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 2 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
PRC entities has previously managed to recruit around 30 Denmark-based researchers on different types of cooperation agreements, including within the Thousand Talents Program (see first link). However, these cooperation agreements have been abandoned following media scrutiny and political pressure.
- https://politiken.dk/danmark/art8186958/Flere-danske-forskere-har-arbejdet-for-Kina-uden-at-sige-det-til-deres-arbejdsplads
- https://politiken.dk/danmark/art8187855/Det-begynder-som-en-uskyldig-invitation-om-at-komme-til-Kina-og-give-en-forel%C3%A6sning.-Og-s%C3%A5-sidder-forskerne-i-saksen
- https://archive.ph/X3tQC
- https://archive.ph/RNvMs
- https://archive.ph/1MU1p
Supplementary Notes
The Thousand Talents Plan, which is China's program for recruiting high-level talent abroad, included the Chinese Government Friendship Award. Professor Flemming Besenbacher was awarded the Chinese Government Friendship Award in 2012, and Professor Torben Mogensen was given the same honor in 2018. Furthermore, it was awarded to Professor Jens Christian Djurhuus in 2021.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC or to other countries organized or run by PRC-connected individuals or entities.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 3 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
92 countries answered this indicator; 6 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The Sino-Danish Center - an institutionalized cooperation between Danish and Chinese universities - organizes stays abroad at universities in the PRC for both Danish PhD students and researchers. The two Chinese partnership institutions are Chinese Academy of Sciences and University of Chinese Academy of Sciences. / One of the experts has knowledge of one prof. Emeritus who has gotten paid trip to China through PLA contacts (No url, this is based on conversations with one of the professors).
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, organized PRC-connected student groups, such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), are involved in attempts to censor staff or students (e.g. by harassing students protesting human rights abuses in the PRC, or formally complaining about the identification of Taiwan as a country in lecture slides).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There have been some media reports about how Chinese PhD students sign "loyalty contracts" before coming to Denmark to study: Link
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, scholars or academics have been pressured after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC, including via visa denials for PRC travel, workplace censure, lawsuits, legal challenges, or threats thereof.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Not to my knowledge
Supplementary Notes
Nothing has been publicly reported.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected entities have been involved in school or university curriculum design, such as courses about East Asian history, modern politics, etc.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Danmark has the Sino-Danish Center where the University of Chinese Academy of Science is involved, but the SDC does not have courses such as "East Asian hisotry, modern politics, etc.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, scholars have published articles that echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. an academic who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Economy
The Economy Domain measures the PRC‘s economic leverage in the Index country, and how this is used to influence economic policy or corporate behavior in ways that favor the PRC.
The PRC is my country's number one trading partner (for trade in goods only).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
USA, Germany and Sweden are among Denmarks biggest trading partners. China is 4th
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
PRC-connected entities own more than 25% of my country’s bilateral sovereign debt.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
93 countries answered this indicator; 5 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Denmark has strong FDI screening laws now, stricter than the EU
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
The PRC is the top customer for my country’s extractive industries.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-related entities own, operate or substantially control critical infrastructure (e.g. ports, power plants, digital data centers, etc) or sensitive sectors (biotech, raw materials, etc.)
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country joined (or applied to join) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Denmark was a founding member.
- https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html
- https://um.dk/en/danida/partners/int-org/aiib-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, major businesses are members of the Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce, or of the Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Alliance, or of the Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Danske Bank joined the Cross-border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an indirect participant in August 2018, along with seven other financial institutions.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade/investment sanctions, boycotts) after the government, private companies, or NGOs made statements or introduced policies deemed unfavorable to the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There have been no public reports about the use of economic coercion. Beijing has largely refrained from using coercive measures against Denmark (with the sanctioning of Alliance of Democracies as a notable exception); see Link
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has free-trade agreement(s) with the PRC (either bilateral or as part of regional agreement(s)) that primarily deals with trade in goods or services, including digital goods or services.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Supplementary Notes
- https://edit.wti.org/document/show/14172cc9-9a1a-49bf-a55e-46c01471ca9f
- https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral-investment-treaties/891/china---denmark-bit-1985-
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, central or local governments have relaxed or removed regulatory restrictions, or have established special economic zones (or free trade zones, industrial parks, etc.) to attract investments or economic participation from the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has undergone a default or restructuring of a public debt arrangement with PRC-affiliated financial entities, which may have involved the transfer of my country's land or infrastructure in exchange for debt forgiveness.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Society
The Society Domain measures the extent and effectiveness of the PRC‘s efforts to advance its soft power in the Index country, including its influence over the actions and views of local organizations and citizens.
In my country, there are local groups or organizations with words like “Promotion of Peaceful Reunification” in their name, and they regularly publicize their views on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang issues.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 1 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
An organization called “丹麦中国和平统一促进会(China Council for the Peaceful National Reunification in Denmark)” exists.
Supplementary Notes
With respect to indicators 1-3, search queries in both Danish and Chinese didn't yield any findings.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are members and member organizations of United World Chinese Association (世界华人协会).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Supplementary Notes
With respect to indicators 1-3, search queries in both Danish and Chinese didn't yield any findings.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, labor unions have engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) through exchanges or official visits, received material or financial donations, or participated in training sessions offered by the ACFTU on subjects like collective bargaining.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Supplementary Notes
With respect to indicators 1-3, search queries in both Danish and Chinese didn't yield any findings.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat Festival tournaments, etc) hosted or sponsored by organizations or personnel linked to the UFWD, or by PRC diplomats.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The Chinese embassy in Denmark hosts several events for the Chinese diaspora, including Lunar New Year.
- http://dk.china-embassy.gov.cn/zdjl/202402/t20240201_11237467.htm
- http://dk.china-embassy.gov.cn/zdjl/202402/t20240201_11237483.htm
- https://kinaforeningen.dk/?cat=10
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations, such as the All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联), that are closely engaged with their local counterparts through exchanges or official visits, providing material or financial donations, or hosting training sessions.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 1 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
A memorandum of cooperation was signed in 2017 between the Danish Writers Association and the China Writers Association. Furthermore, in 2018 there was the First China-Denmark Literature Forum.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities donate money or provide other types of support to religious communities and charities.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Chinese in Denmark organize the Denmark Love Home (丹麦爱心家园)), which serves as a supplement to charitable organizations and is close to the China Council for the Peaceful National Reunification in Denmark.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, the PRC government or PRC-connected entities distribute entertainment products (including: drama and TV shows) or related hardwares (e.g. OTT streaming players hosting PRC media channels) freely or at a cheap price.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 1 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Such entertainment products can be freely accessed via YouTube. Additionally, Shenzhen Radio, Film and Television Group has partnered with mainstream media from Denmark and other nations to co-produce and co-broadcast a series of reports titled "Hello China, Hello World (你好中国 你好世界)” on their respective media platforms.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected entities are the main shareholders or developers of the top five popular social media/messaging apps, based on their usage.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In 2017, Tencent, a Chinese company, acquired a stake in SnapChat.
- https://www.generaxion.com/dk/some-brugere-2024/
- https://www.reuters.com/article/business/china-s-tencent-takes-12-percent-stake-in-snap-as-shares-plunge-idUSKBN1D81G3/
- https://www.generaxion.com/dk/some-brugere-2024/
Supplementary Notes
According to a recent survey by Statistics Denmark, the five most popular social media in Denmark (in terms of share of population) are: Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn and Pinterest (TikTok is number six).
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are cultural events, cultural exchange projects, or cultural organizations that are funded by or receive funding from PRC-connected entities, including in sports.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 3 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The China Cultural Center in Copenhagen organizes such events.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, gamers, gaming communities, or game developers/publishers have been involved in freedom of speech controversies related to the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, polling data or opinion surveys indicate that a majority of citizens hold favorable views toward the PRC government.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
90 countries answered this indicator; 8 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
No, around 3 out of 4 Danes hold negative views of China.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Military
The Military Domain gauges the bilateral military relationship between the PRC and the Index country, including PRC efforts to influence local military personnel.
My country currently imports (or receives in-kind donation of) military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment from the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
As noted elsewhere (see Technology indicator 4), Danish police authorities have until recently imported and used both Chinese-made drones and sureillance cameras. But this practice has been terminated.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country’s government has participated in one or more multilateral security dialogues organized by the PRC (e.g. China-Africa Peace and Security Forum; the Conference on Interaction & Confidence Building Measures in Asia).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC (including arrangements where PLA-affiliated professionals work in domestic labs researching dual-use technologies).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish bases.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Not since a Chinese investor attempted to take over an abandoned marine station in Greenland in 2016.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has participated in a humanitarian relief/disaster assistance (HADR) effort.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military personnel are permanently or rotationally deployed (excluding defense attaches and peacekeepers).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In 2023, two Chinese defense attaches took part in a group visit to three Danish military sites (together with defense attaches from other countries). The sites contained no classified information.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, military professionals have participated in military education or training programs provided by the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, senior military or civilian defense leaders have participated in bilateral meetings with PLA officers at or above the one-star rank.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Supplementary Notes
In the past, yes.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officers have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public service.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
90 countries answered this indicator; 8 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials publicly advocate for friendly foreign policy or military cooperation with the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
94 countries answered this indicator; 4 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country cooperates with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on military exchange exercises, including drills and war games.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Law Enforcement
The Law Enforcement Domain measures law enforcement cooperation between the PRC and the Index country, as well as the nature and extent of PRC-related criminal activity in the Index country.
My country currently maintains an extradition treaty, legal mutual assistance or other similar arrangements with the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combating terrorism.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected gangs (such as Triad, 三合会) are known to be operating in my country.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, security services (安保/保安) offered by private PRC companies are contracted by national or subnational governments.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, law enforcement and judicial-related training offered by PRC-connected individuals or entities have been accepted by national or subnational governments.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, organized local criminal groups are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate, or punish individuals critical of the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises that were suspected to be initiated from the PRC.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In their most recent report on the "espionage threat" against Denmark, the Danish Police Intelligence Service warns that the "threat primarily emanates from Russia and China", adding that "China has substantial cyber espionage capabilities and poses a constant threat to Danish authorities and companies." Moreover, the report also claims "that China may use any Danish dependency on Chinese components as a means of pressure in case of major deterioration of the bilateral relations between China and Denmark." Moreover, members of the parliament have been hacked.
- https://pet.dk/en/-/media/mediefiler/pet/dokumenter/analyser-og-vurderinger/vurdering-af-spionagetruslen-mod-danmark/vurdering-af-spionagetruslen-mod-danmark-2023_uk_web.pdf
- https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2024-05-15-politikere-maaber-efter-orientering-om-hackingsag
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities have established extra-legal physical premises from which to surveil or detain members of the Chinese diaspora (e.g. overseas police service stations).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
93 countries answered this indicator; 5 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My government has arbitrarily detained people at the behest of the PRC, such as those who engage in political activism or those who are members of minority groups.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has extradited or deported individuals to the PRC despite criticism from politicians, government employees, or NGOs.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has deployed video or internet surveillance systems from the PRC for law enforcement.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
94 countries answered this indicator; 4 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Danish authorities (including the police) have acquired Chinese-produced surveillance cameras from Hikvision and DJI drones. There are currently plans to phase out the use of both drones and surveillance cameras by Danish authorities.
- https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/minister-om-indkoeb-af-kinesisk-producerede-overvaagningskameraer-vi-er-noedt-til-at-se-realiteterne-i-oejnene
- https://nyheder.tv2.dk/samfund/2023-05-18-politiet-har-indkoebt-130-kinesiske-droner-de-suger-al-den-data-de-kan-komme-i-naerheden-af-advarer-ekspert#:~:text=Dansk%20politi%20har%20p%C3%A5%20seks,p%C3%A5%20baggrund%20af%20en%20aktindsigt
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Technology
The Technology Domain gauges the PRC‘s influence over the technology sector in the Index country, including the activity and financial leverage of PRC companies, use of PRC hardware, and bilateral research partnerships.
In my country, PRC-connected entities (such as China Mobile, China Unicom or China Telecom) or their subsidiaries provide telecom services.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is one Danish mobile telecom service company, `3´, whose majority owner is a Hongkong-based multinational conglomerate: CK Hutchison Holdings Lmt (see first link). However, all the main Danish telecom companies have terminated their cooperation with Huawei and ZTE on 5G in recent years (see second link).
- https://www.3.dk/om3/om-virksomheden/
- https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/viden/teknologi/sidste-danske-teleselskab-dropper-5g-fra-huawei-nu-gaar-kineserne-efter-6g
Supplementary Notes
Therefore, it would be misleading to let the PRC score 4 points on this indicator.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, telecoms have signed agreements to adopt hardwares or technical specifications of 4G or 5G cellular networks that are produced or developed by Huawei, ZTE or other PRC enterprises.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 2 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The main Danish telecom companies (TDC, Telia, Telenor and 3) have been effectively banned from using Chinese telecom equipment as part of their critical digital infrastructure since 2021 (see first link). However, some companies are still in the process of phasing out Chinese manufactured equipment, incl. wireless routers (see second link).
- https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2021/1156
- https://finans.dk/tech/ECE15900176/historisk-indgreb-tdc-tvinges-til-at-droppe-huaweiaftale/
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, internet service providers have signed agreements to adopt hardware or technical specifications for Wi-Fi or fiber optic/broadband networks that are produced or developed by PRC enterprises.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 2 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
91 countries answered this indicator; 7 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The main Danish internet service providers have been effectively banned from using Chinese telecom equipment as part of their critical digital infrastructure since 2021 (see first link). However, some companies are still in the process of phasing out Chinese manufactured equipment, incl. wireless routers (see second link).
- https://www.electronic-supply.dk/article/view/1034822/afgorelse_tdc_skal_droppe_kinesisk_hardware
- https://www.computerworld.dk/art/284948/danske-teleselskabers-udlaan-af-kinesiske-routere-til-kunderne-lander-paa-ministerens-bord
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-connected entities are authorized to supply tech-related equipment for critical infrastructure (such as airports, public transport, government IT networks, ports etc.).
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There have been reports in recent years that several Danish authorities (including the police) have procured Chinese drones from DJI (see first link). Moreover, Danish authorities (again including the police) have acquired Chinese-produced surveillance cameras from Hikvision. There are currently plans to phase out the use of both drones and surveillance cameras by Danish authorities.
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/int_kina/art9352820/Politiet-har-indk%C3%B8bt-130-kinesiske-droner.-Nu-advarer-PET
- https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/minister-om-indkoeb-af-kinesisk-producerede-overvaagningskameraer-vi-er-noedt-til-at-se-realiteterne-i-oejnene
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, the central or local government has signed agreements to adopt biometric surveillance technology (such as facial, voice, DNA or gait recognition) produced by PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
HIK vision cameras
- https://politiken.dk/viden/tech/art9070198/De-er-dybt-involveret-i-menneskerettighedskr%C3%A6nkelser.-Alligevel-k%C3%B8ber-Danmark-nu-ind-hos-firmaet
- https://jv.dk/kolding/47-kameraer-fra-omstridt-kinesisk-teknologifirma-overvaager-borgerne-i-kolding-kommunen-er-tryg-trods-amerikansk-forbud
Supplementary Notes
There are the HIK vision camera acquired by the Danish Road Directorate, but they do not contain such sophisticated technology. Moreover, all Danish authorities have recently been told not to buy surveillance technology from Hikvision as the linked story reports.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, one or more cities have procured, or have signed contracts with PRC-connected entities to establish “smart city systems.”
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country is directly served by a subsea or land-based major fiber optic internet cable built by a PRC-connected entity, or has greenlit plans for one to be built in the future.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, PRC-affiliated venture capital, financial firms or PRC government entities invest in local technology start-ups.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
94 countries answered this indicator; 4 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
This is highly unlikely due to a national law on investment screening to ensure a systematic assessment of foreign economic investments in terms of potential national security risks, including whether the investor is “controlled by a foreign government”.
- https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2021/842
- https://scandasia.com/innovation-house-china-denmark-opens/
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, companies have publicly announced that they had signed MOUs to collaborate on technological development (such as collaborations in A.I., Blockchain, Cloud Computing, Big Data) with PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There was a Danish-Chinese collaboration project about blockchain technology, but this was announced five years ago. As I can’t find any updates on the project, the project has probably been abandoned in the meantime.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has signed space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding, or formed space cooperation mechanisms with PRC-connected entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, the central or local government(s) has collaborated with the PRC on endorsing the use of the BeiDou satellite navigation system.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Domestic Politics
The Domestic Politics Domain evaluates PRC efforts to influence the political landscape in the Index country, and the footprint of PRC security companies.
In my country, politicians or government employees at the sub-national level are signing agreements with the PRC government or state-owned enterprises.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, local municipalities or provinces have sister-city or sister-province ties (友好城市) with municipalities or provinces in the PRC.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 2 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There are still a number of active Danish-Chinese sister city partnership arrangements (see some examples via the links), but the overall direction has been towards cancelling/not renewing such arrangements in the past few years (see Martin Marcussen, "Danske byer har altid haft det svært med Kina", in Andreas Forsby & Bertel Heurlin, Danske perspektiver på Kina, København: Djøf Forlag).
- https://hsfo.dk/erhverv/horsens-faar-millionby-som-soesterby
- https://www.vejle.dk/om-kommunen/fakta-om-os/venskabsbyer/
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, politicians or government employees have taken trips to the PRC paid for by PRC-connected individuals or entities.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
92 countries answered this indicator; 6 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
This is highly unlikely as there are no political parties that are supportive of the PRC. Danish government officials are also highly likely to accept such invitations.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, politicians or government employees at the local (non-national) level visit the PRC and meet with PRC officials and think tanks.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Representatives of a political party in my country’s national legislature have been invited to visit the PRC or attended events hosted by the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (中共中央对外联络部), including World Political Parties Summits, CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meetings, BRICS Political Parties Dialogues, Think Tanks and Civil Society Organizations Fora, etc.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
This is highly unlikely as there are no political parties that are supportive of the PRC.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign finance or significant in-kind donations from PRC-connected entities or individuals.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have hosted fundraisings or have provided other forms of support for government employees, politicians or parties.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
PRC officials or PRC state media have criticized, harassed, or threatened local politicians, local government officials, or political parties in my country due to their activities, statements or policy advocacy.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 3 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Danish NGO "Alliance of Democracies", headed by former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has been sanctioned by the PRC since 2021. Moreover, two Danish MPs (as well as two youth politicians), who helped political activist Ted Hui flee Hong Kong in late 2020 have been warned (by the Danish authorities) not to travel to countries that might be willing to extradite them to the Chinese authorities (based on confidential information that the PRC has been preparing a lawsuit against these politicians). The two MPs have also had their computers hacked by the PRC back in 2021.
- http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/22/c_139827908.htm
- https://jyllands-posten.dk/indland/ECE12800475/kritikere-af-kina-pet-har-advaret-os-om-rejser/
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/int_kina/art9831417/%C2%BBDe-nye-oplysninger-g%C3%B8r-mig-endnu-mere-sikker%C2%AB-Uffe-Elb%C3%A6k-anklager-Kina-for-at-hacke-hans-telefon-og-computer
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/int_kina/art9882674/FBI-bekr%C3%A6fter-at-danske-politikere-var-m%C3%A5l-i-globalt-hackerangreb-mod-Kina-kritikere
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly echoed PRC talking points (e.g. denying PRC human rights issues, arguing that the PRC’s one-party political system could be beneficial for my country’s economic growth).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, politicians or government employees have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public office.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, officials, political parties, and political elites try to suppress criticism of the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
92 countries answered this indicator; 6 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Examples of such self-censorship were documented in a special investigation (by the so-called Tibet Commission), focusing in particular on a constitutional breach back in 2012 when Danish police authorities prevented peaceful pro-Tibetan protesters from being visible to Hu Jintao's motorcade during an official Chinese state vists. However, no such incidents have been reported in recent years.
- https://www.ft.dk/samling/20091/almdel/upn/bilag/24/772818/index.htm
- https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/webfeature/tibetsagen
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Foreign Policy
The Foreign Policy Domain gauges PRC efforts to achieve diplomatic objectives by influencing key actors in the Index country.
My country’s legislature has a joint parliamentary friendship group, committee or other forms of sub-organizations with the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country receives foreign aid or significant in-kind donations from the PRC.
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Not since a minor donation of medical equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
The PRC provides training to diplomats or civil servants on governance from my country (such as at 国家行政学院 or 中央党校).
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
1/ Few, but insignificant
2/ More than a few, but insignificant
3/ Few, but significant
4/ More than a few, and significant
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
Citizens of my country have been detained in the PRC or denied exit for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy.”
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
There is no observation of the Indicator phenomenon.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
In my country, politicians or government officials participate in events or projects affiliated with the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED, 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会).
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
94 countries answered this indicator; 4 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Yes, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development is part of the Sino-Danish Government Green Partnership Action Plan (2023-2026).
- https://kina.um.dk/en/-/media/country-sites/kina-en/denmark-in-china/green-joint-work-programme-23-26-eng.ashx
- https://kina.um.dk/en/about-denmark/denmarks-strategic-partnership-with-china
- https://archive.ph/cwBKy
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country has signed an agreement with the PRC to classify their diplomatic relationship as a "Strategic Partnership" or beyond.
2024
Yes
Answer ( 4 / 4 )
0/ No
4/ Yes
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
The Danish-Chinese Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was initiated in 2008 and renewed in 2023 with a (quite narrow) joint work program, focusing mainly on cooperation on climate changes, sustainability and the environment.
- https://kina.um.dk/en/-/media/country-sites/kina-en/denmark-in-china/green-joint-work-programme-23-26-eng.ashx
- https://kina.um.dk/en/about-denmark/denmarks-strategic-partnership-with-china
- https://archive.ph/cwBKy
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My country unquestionably uses PRC’s "One China Principle" which articulates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, rather than my country's own "One China Policy."
2024
No
Answer ( 0 / 4 )
Skipped
0/ No
4/ Yes
95 countries answered this indicator; 3 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
A recent DIIS report details the Danish approach to the One China policy/principle.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016); except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in indicator 7.
2024
Silence
0/ My country has rejected PRC‘s claim
2/ My country has remained silent
4/ My country has adhered to PRC‘s claim
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
No URLS, this is naturally not something that is official policy, but it is well known.
Supplementary Notes
The Danish government has instead supported attempts to reach a joint EU position in this regard.
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy towards the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.
2024
Oppose
Skipped
0/ My country has rejected PRC‘s claim
2/ My country has remained silent
4/ My country has adhered to PRC‘s claim
97 countries answered this indicator; 1 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In 2021, in a joint statement (with the Nordic-Baltic countries), the Danish government stated that "We are gravely concerned about the information presented in reports and statements on the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" (see first link). Denmark has also supported other multilateral statements, criticizing the human rights situation in Xinjiang (see second link).
- https://un.mfa.ee/joint-nordic-baltic-statement-at-the-high-level-virtual-event-on-the-situation-of-the-uyghurs-and-other-turkic-muslim-minorities-in-xinjiang/
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/art7295108/Danmark-og-21-andre-lande-udtaler-h%C3%A5rd-kritik-af-Kina
- https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-statement-on-human-rights-violations-in-xinjiang-at-the-un-third-committee
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy toward the Tibet population.
2024
Silence
Skipped
0/ My country has rejected PRC‘s claim
2/ My country has remained silent
4/ My country has adhered to PRC‘s claim
96 countries answered this indicator; 2 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
In the past several years, the Danish government has not publicly criticized the Chinese government with respect to its political suppression in Tibet. For example, during a conversation in 2021 between former Danish foreign minister Jeppe Kofod and his Chinese counterpart, Kofod only addressed the human rights situation in Xinjiang and Hongkong: Link
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.
My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's ongoing repression in Hong Kong, such as the imposition of the National Security Law or other actions to persecute Hong Kong protestors or activists.
2024
Oppose
0/ My country has rejected PRC‘s claim
2/ My country has remained silent
4/ My country has adhered to PRC‘s claim
98 countries answered this indicator; 0 countries skipped this indicator
Supporting Evidence
Some criticism in direct bilateral talks (see link), but most of the public criticism of China's approach in Hongkong has been voiced on former Danish foreign minister Jeppe Kofod's twitter account.
- https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE12708593/jeppe-kofod-har-talt-om-menneskerettigheder-med-kinakollega/
- https://politiken.dk/internationalt/art8135892/Kina-sk%C3%A6lder-ud-p%C3%A5-Danmark-efter-Jeppe-Kofods-tweet
- https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-statement-on-human-rights-violations-in-xinjiang-at-the-un-third-committee
Answered by 2 anonymous experts, and has been reviewed by another 1 anonymous expert.